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Abstract
Climate-induced violence has become more prominent and scrutinized in research,
media, and discussion in the last decade with the emergence of new patterns of violence.
Conflicts have been scrutinized particularly in key regions and countries such as West Africa, the
Middle East, and Central Asia, which are the focus of the three case studies in this paper. The
research is centered on several types of violence such as civil war and terrorism, and then further
expanded to how climate change may or may not influence their patterns. Correspondingly, there
is also an analysis on the importance of state stability and action and how the global order is
responding. Ultimately, this thesis reinforces the argument that states need to provide support to
land-based livelihoods in areas affected by climate change.
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Introduction
When we think of climate change, we tend to think of icebergs breaking off into the warming
sea, or the worrying high temperatures of the winter season. Pictures of polar bears resting on a
singular block of ice, or wildfires raging across acres of forest have been permeating news
headlines on this subject for the past decade. It's fair to say that the majority of people both in the
United States and the world have accepted and acknowledged the presence of climate change in
our world. The issue continues to gain traction in governments and media, but the effects of
climate change on other aspects of society have not been as scrutinized in the current zeitgeist.
Particularly, the effect it has on violence and war has not been receiving mass attention.
However, there has been growing interest and debate in scholars, researchers, and institutions of
the connection between climate change and conflict. Some think that while climate change is a
prevailing threat to society, it does not correlate with violent trends in developing countries.
Others do find a connection and claim that climate change has induced several severe conflicts in
countries where adequate state support does not exist for insecure individuals. Disagreements
between the two arguments lie in if there is enough evidence to claim that climate change is
actively and currently inciting violence.
On one hand, if this is true and actively occurring, the implications would be devastating
according to the current nature of our degrading atmosphere. Immediate policies would be
needed for global cooperation, and also individual states would need to implement climate
adaptation policies to offset the potential increases in casualties. On the other hand, the focus
should not be on specific climate policies but rather fostering economic freedom and prosperity
for those affected by violence, which are usually agriculturalists and pastoralists. Political
stability is also prioritized, since these services would be rolled out by government institutions.
When I first encountered this problem and debate, I found it convincing that climate change
effects can influence certain types of violence. However, each instance in its respective country
has its own complex characteristics and progression, which opens up several avenues for
contention on the main factor of blame. Therefore, I wanted to study three prominent situations
of violence in three different states: Nigeria and the Chad Basin, Afghanistan, and Syria. These
states deal with many forms of violence, but the ones I am most concerned with are
farmer-herder violence, terrorism, and civil war. These case studies will provide the current data
on climate change and violence in these regions and states, as well as comparing this to the
economic and political health. Through explicating these cases, I hope to provide a perspective
that encapsulates both arguments that then allows for the most beneficial solutions for the states
involved. Of course, in a topic so complex and multi-faceted as climate change and violence,
there is great difficulty in narrowing down the appropriate approach to an explanation or
solution. But, in analyzing specific cases with different types of violence but similar livelihoods
and unstable governments there are connections that I found to be illuminating and important.
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Methodology
For my research I utilized many reports, articles, and interviews, especially in the beginning, to
collect as much information on the areas of interest as possible. I chose the regions of Nigeria,
Syria, and Afghanistan because of the severity and uniqueness of their environment and politics.
Nigeria and the Chad Basin are increasingly plagued with terrorist groups vying for control, but
also farmer-herder conflicts between communities and ethnicities are rampant. Slightly similar is
the situation in Afghanistan, where drought is allowing for terrorist groups to take advantage of
farmers and control their crops. Syria has a case of water weaponization, showing another aspect
of terrorist groups utilizing natural resources for their benefit. I felt that combining these states in
my paper would allow me to better explicate the current situation/debate around climate-change
conflict. Especially since all of these states are rapidly evolving even today, an analysis of their
data is always useful for moving towards understanding and solutions.
Therefore, I will start by looking at previous scholarship on this topic, which can tend to be
contradictory. Then, I will present my case studies on Nigeria, Syria, and Afghanistan’s climate
change and conflict situations. Then, I will discuss my analysis and outlook on these states, and
attempt to synthesize previous theories and provide an outlook that isn’t staunchly in favor of
one or the other side of climate conflict. Three specific types of violence will be analyzed
separately, and each provides a lens for understanding the severity of climate change and its
development in modern society.
I then attempt to work through different suggestions for solutions made by international
organizations and developed countries. Different outlooks will call for different solutions, and
trying to synthesize these ideas is ultimately my goal to create the most effective and practical
way to move forward in the discourse on this issue.
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Literature Review
For my literature review, I will be focusing on scholarship surrounding forms of climate change
impacts and violence. One of my main priorities is to highlight not just one form of causal
violence from climate change, such as drought-induced community conflict. Rather, I wish to
draw examples of violence from different states and circumstances to show how complex climate
change can be, and that a multifaceted approach is necessary. Therefore, I will be using Tropic of
Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence by Christian Parenti, “Insurgency,
Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate” by Katharina Nett and Lukas Rüttinger,
and Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives by
Wiesmann U, Hurni H; with an international group of co-editors. All of these sources draw from
several different state situations to formulate their argument, which is my goal as well. They also
have very different conclusions based on their research or experience. Through these sources, an
explanation of the historical roots of geographic violence in my regions of research will be done,
as well as an analysis on the various theories of climate change conflict made by previous
scholars.
Tropic of Chaos
One of the main pillars of my theory of climate change violence is that the absence of
responsible state power/aid allows for an exacerbation of harmful climate change effects. This is
also a theory that is emphasized in Parenti’s Tropic of Chaos. Parenti’s independent research
focused on developing countries facing high levels of violence, and also their changes in climate.
In his synthesis of prior militarization and counterinsurgency, he explains the importance of past
interventions and wars in developing countries. For example, counterinsurgency efforts in
Guatemala during its civil war had completely devastated rural communities with the military’s
scorched-earth campaigns and guerilla warfare. Even after the war ended in the 1990s, crime
took the place of war, and it remains as a massive problem in Guatemalan society.1 This is the
case for many Latin American countries, where proxy or banana wars occurred during the Cold
War, and left the country’s government incapable of a safe state. As Parenti puts it:
“Because counterinsurgency is war that, by design, attacks the social fabric, it has sowed chaos
and set the stage for the catastrophic convergence. Leaving corruption, ignorance, crime, and
anomie in their wake, small, dirty wars have created societies totally incapable of dealing with
climate change. And now, armed adaptation is set to double down on a bad bet by applying more
counterinsurgency to the global matrix of crisis.”2
The last sentence especially stresses the grave outcomes that are being played out in certain
regions. In his chapter on Kenya, Parenti explains the situation of militant groups spreading
throughout the country in the absence of modern state power. Militant groups utilize small arms
like machine guns and grenade launchers to fight other local groups in competition for land,
cattle, or power.
1
2

Christian Parenti, Tropic of Chaos, (New York:Nation Books, 2011), 33-34.
Parenti, Tropic of Chaos, 36.
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“As the means of administration and “extraction” collapse, “bands of armed men” fall away from
the state and are released freelance into society to survive by their own devices. Taxation
becomes theft as soldiers and police revert back to bribery, extortion, and banditry. Where the
state is totally absent, gangs arise to govern slums like proto-city-states.”3
These gangs or militant groups are benefiting from climatic degradations, and Parenti illustrates
their danger through his observations. Therefore, he states that the current climate crisis is a
political problem, not technical or economic. This especially is seen in his dire forecasts of the
future for affected countries. Most prominently, the idea of the “armed lifeboat” is warned as a
looming possibility. With migration becoming increasingly common and necessary in climate
changing regions, the possibility for xenophobia and violent reactions amongst Western
governments and media. Parenti puts it bluntly:
“Our current style of anti-immigrant policing—of which climate change will surely bring
more—is eroding civil liberties and thus fundamentally transforming America, returning the
nation to its more primitive condition: a herrenvolk democracy based on segregation and routine
violence, in which race and nationality mask raw class power. Border militarization and interior
enforcement are the legal gray zone where the US Bill of Rights is most radically curtailed”.4
Insurgency, Terrorism, and Organized Crime
Nett and Ruttinger use a more research oriented approach as opposed to Parenti’s on-the ground
observational narrative. Their main emphasis is on climate change as a threat multiplier towards
fragility and conflict. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are the specific entities that are being
analyzed to see if climate change is a contributing factor to their rise. Defining and studying
NSAGs was beneficial for my understanding of their current activities.
“Many NSAGs do not seek to gain political control, since they can best achieve their goals
outside the realm of formal state structures and laws and are characterized by their distance from
formal power (Briscoe 2013). Many armed groups today do not conceive of peace or settlement
of political disputes as desirable outcomes for a conflict. Instead, economically motivated
warfare, in which the group’s strategy relies on income from illicit economic activities and thus
seeks a perpetuation of violence”. 5

3

Parenti, Tropic of Chaos, 94.
Parenti, Tropic of Chaos, 209.
5
Katharina Nett and Lukas Ruttinger, Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate
(Berlin: Adelphi, 2016), 5.
4
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The four case studies conducted in the text were very helpful in providing a basis for regional
climate and conflict characteristics. This research succeeds in efficiently explaining how climate
change manifests into livelihoods and communities, with special attention paid to agriculture.
The data used is concise and useful for building an understanding of agricultural patterns,
degradation, and adaptation. In response to the rise of NSAGs, they provide multiple solutions
and strategies for climate change action. Many of them center around sustainable interventions
and peace-building, which Parenti chose to not focus on since he felt they did not suitably
address the larger problem of political discourse. However, I felt that Nett and Ruttinger
suggested some good points, such as disaster risk reduction. “If underpinned by a plan and
political will, disasters and crises can also be used as an opportunity to increase resilience and
not only to rebuild better but also to increase legitimacy and even build peace”. 6 They make sure
to emphasize that these are broad approaches to solutions, and the real change lies in the hands of
policymakers. Overall, the format and content of this report was successful and proved to be
popular in influencing later scholarship in climate change conflict.
The Missing Link
In “The Missing Link: Environmental Change, Institutions, and Violent Conflicts”, Goetschel
and Peclard diverge from the previous report’s narrative. They argue that establishing a direct
link between climate change effects and violence or international security is reductionist and
unrealistic. Instead, they stress the missing link “political, social, and cultural institutions in
mediating between the two terms of the equation”.7 Institutional responsibility is argued as the
main importance in discussions about natural resource conflicts and environmental degradation.
Almost all scholarship mentions state institutions’ responsibility in mitigating conflicts and
addressing livelihood issues or disparities through the lens of environmental causes. However,
Goetschel and Peclard take this a step further, stating:
“Climate change may render human interaction and social regulation more difficult, but it will
hardly ever directly affect the probability of violence. Climate policy will not bring about peace
any more than peace policy will improve the climate”.8
They don’t rebuke the idea that climate change might have some effect on scarcity and conflict,
but instead they are trying to shift the focus of climate change causing violence to the state
institutions being the main root of violence. I found it important to showcase this point of view
as well, since it is echoed in many specific discussions of violence and climate change,
particularly with the Syrian Civil War which is brought up in its respective case study.
I agree with the mindset they emphasize: solutions should be grounded in the dimension of
realistic significance. For them, that means within political institutions. Examples brought up of
water scarcity conflicts and indigenous land ownership rights all were drawn back to problems
within the state policies. This analysis will be scrutinized and incorporated into my own findings.
6

Nett and Ruttinger, 56.
Laurent Goetschel and Didier Picardhe “Missing Link: Environmental Change, Institutions, and Violent
Conflicts” in Research for Sustainable Development Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives
(Switzerland: NCCR North-South, 2011), 451
8
Goetschel and Picharde, “Missing Link”, 453.
7

Kurdziel 9

Case Study
To explicate climate induced violence, it is necessary to analyze how it is manifesting in certain
regions. The regions have high rates of transnational violence, a decline of state power, and a
strong susceptibility to the encroaching effects of climate change. Currently, regions in several
corners of the world are experiencing intense outbursts of transnational and political violence,
such as in West Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Non-state armed groups have gained
more and more control over civilian populations in Afghanistan and Syria in particular, with war
crimes and casualties being reported time and time again. Climate change has not been regarded
as much of a contributing factor to these state situations, but it becomes a more exacerbated
factor after seeing the severity and linkage of changing climate conditions.
There are several indicators that analysts have specified to be predictors of climate change
damage and/or violence. Seven indicators of climate fragility risks have been specified by the G7
Foreign Ministries9:
Local resource competition- when natural resources dwindle, competition for what remains can
become intense.
Livelihood insecurity and migration- Livelihoods that depend on natural resources and terrain
can become more insecure after climate change related damage, which causes those with
insecure livelihoods to migrate in large numbers.
Extreme weather disasters-These are happening on a more frequent and destructive basis,
causing greater vulnerability among affected regions and groups
Fragile food prices and provisions-Because of natural resource and agricultural disruption, it is
expected that food prices will rise and market prices will inflate, causing volatility in markets
and potentially leading to dangerous disruption and scarcity.
Transboundary water management- climate change has been impacting water sources and
distribution, potentially leading to increased competition for control
Sea-level rise and coastal degradation- flooding from rising sea levels can cause unstable
migration and displacement of vulnerable groups, potentially causing more situations regarding
ocean resources and boundaries
Unintended effects of climate policies- climate change policies have the potential to not be
enacted in stabilizing ways, and can have negative effects on fragile regions without proper
analysis.

9

Nett and Ruttinger, 8.
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How many different issues climate change can impact
Taken From OECD
These factors are displayed in the following regions/countries I have outlined. However, not all
regions are the same in how they react or adapt to climate change. Each area has its own very
unique characteristics and background that shapes the course of its popular livelihoods,
populations, and conflict. For West Africa, pastoralism and agriculture takes up a majority of the
discourse with vulnerability and displacement. In Central Asia, maladaptive practices in
agriculture and water management have pushed forth dangerous groups into control. In the
Middle East, extremism and civil war have become a discourse for drought-related conflict. All
cases have low state capacities for reactive policies and damage control. In this gap, violent
groups can take control and conflict can spread.
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Nigeria
West Africa’s Climate Profile
The UN’s International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has continually reported on dangerous
effects that have emerged in the vulnerable regions of this case study. In their Sixth Assessment
Report, West Africa was reported to have increases in river flooding, droughts, and heavy
precipitation as a result of monsoons. Surface temperature is increasing more rapidly in Africa
than the average global scale as a result of climate change, which shows that this region bears the
forefront of global warming.10 The increase of hazardous flooding and temperature risings lead to
more erratic weather patterns and dramatic shifts in terrain and agriculture. Some prominent
terrain that is being impacted is the Sahel, or the transition area between the Sahara and the
grasslands in the South. Precipitation extremes will be largest during the monsoon seasons over
the Sahel, and this can create disastrous effects on water resources and ecosystems.11 Dry, arid
seasons will also become more pronounced and difficult to prepare for. Therefore, some of the
most obvious impacts of climate change are seen in agriculture and cattle livelihoods. On top of
this, the most prominent form of income is in agriculture for individuals and their families.

Climate Change Vulnerability in Nigeria
Taken from Ignatius, A. Madu, “Rurality and climate change vulnerability in Nigeria:
Assessment towards evidence based even rural development policy”
10

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “SIXTH ASSESSMENT REPORT”, Regional fact
sheet - Africa.
11
Alisher Mirzabaev and Jianguo Wu et. al, “Desertification: Special Report on Climate Change and
Land”, IPCC
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The Farmer-Herder Conflict
About 50 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa rely on pastoralism for their income, and about
70% of those individuals are impoverished.12 Already, there are economic tensions and instability
within this area of work, and desertification of already arid regions can aggravate instability. A
state that has been actively dealing with emerging conflicts born from changing herding patterns
is Nigeria. As a whole, Nigeria’s economy relies heavily on climate-impacted areas such as
fishing, agriculture, and pastoralism. On top of that, 70% of the workforce is in those job
sectors.13 Therefore, when conflicts arise from these livelihoods, it has the potential to seriously
impact thousands of lives.
In particular, the farmer-herder conflict has been a large source of violence and displacement in
Nigeria. This conflict stemmed from climate-induced changes in the environment that affected
both pastoralists and farmers in the Middle Belt region. The Middle Belt lies across central
Nigeria, forming a transition zone between the North and the South. This area has several states
that have conflicting ethnic, religious, and cultural differences with no clear group majority. This
is unique from the other regions in Nigeria, where the North is predominatly Muslim and the
South predominantly Christian. This is a key factor that plays into the current conflict between
herders and farmers.
The climate and terrain in this region is heavily intertwined with the actions and livelihoods of
the people in the Middle Belt. For pastoralists, the seasons dictate how they move their cattle-in
dry seasons they move to the south and in wet seasons they move back to the north. However,
the desertification that has been growing in this region is pushing them further and further south
onto new terrain. Oftentimes this new terrain the cattle graze on belongs to farmers. Farmers
have also expanded their fields to block some migration routes for herders, increasing the
competition for good land. On a larger scale, 75% of the entire Sahel region is too dry for cattle
to graze, forcing herders all over Sub-Saharan Africa to adjust routes to find water and good
grazing.14

12

Marta Schock and Christoph Lakner, “The number of poor people continues to rise in Sub-Saharan
Africa, despite a slow decline in the poverty rate”,
13
Aaron Sayne, “Climate Change Adaptation and Conflict in Nigeria” (United States: United States
Institute of Peace, 2011), 5.
14
“Where Climate Change Is Reality: Supporting Africa’s Sahel Pastoralists to Secure a Resilient Future”,
The World Bank, 2020.
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The increase in fatalities in Nigeria is shown here to be particularly troubling
Taken from Africa Center for Strategic Studies
The Role of the State
The other factor in this conflict is the lack of helpful governmental intervention. Militias have
been growing in popularity and power as a result of tensions and economic frustrations, and the
government has not implemented any control or prosecution of group attacks. There have also
been many failed attempts to combat illegal grazing, which has just been met by herder’s anger
and migration into neighboring states, consequently causing more conflict. 15 The agricultural
sector has received little attention the past few decades from the Nigerian administration because
of their shift to being invested in oil in the 1970s and 80s.16 Though some laws have been passed
to regulate herder actions, little enforcement has been completed. Some have accused the
government of being overly sympathetic concerning the actions of pastoralists, and not enough
protections being implemented for the farmers.
The outcome of these two factors, along with anthropological and social tensions, have resulted
in 300,000 people being displaced in the Middle Belt region. This farmer-herder conflict has
caused dramatic violence in its own realm, with climate change being an identified factor.
Another layer to this issue is its effect on terrorism in the region. In particular, Boko Haram has
been a group wreaking havoc in Nigeria, and its growth has been caused by many of the issues
discussed prior.
15

“Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding Deadly Conflict”, International Crisis Group, 2017.
Ugwumba Egbuta, “UNDERSTANDING THE HERDER-FARMER CONFLICT IN NIGERIA”, 42.

16
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Boko Haram’s Growth
In areas where Boko Haram is the strongest, around 71% of the population live in poverty and
almost 60% of youth are unemployed.17 The correlation between the two comes to no surprise,
since Boko Haram and many similar terrorist organisations look to recruit individuals who live in
very weak socio-economic conditions. These struggling agriculturalists and pastoralists are not
receiving adequate support from the government, and their livelihoods are being slowly degraded
by a changing environment and increasing competition. Boko Haram has economic incentives, as
well as political and social rhetoric against government and cultural corruption that resonates
with distressed youth and laborers. The impacts of climate change such as displacement, poverty,
and unemployment provide the necessary opening for terrorist groups to enter and grow.
Within the area surrounding Lake Chad, there have been several resurgences of Boko Haram and
their break-off organization, ISWAP. This area is home to about 17.4 million people, and around
10.7 million of these people require humanitarian assistance.18Climate change impacts in this
area are debated amongst some analysts, but there are several concerning progressions of
weather patterns and water levels. Though several droughts have occurred in this area thus
desertifying the terrain, much of the damage was caused by man-made operations. This involved
the construction of dams, irrigation projects, and irresponsible/unsustainable methods of water
extraction. In the 1970s and 80s the water levels of the lake were reduced to 2,000 km as
opposed to 25,000 km, which is about a 90 percent drop.19 However, it has since grown back to
14,000 km and has remained stable.20
Livelihoods in this region have been forced to adapt, or have been eradicated. Some of the most
important and popular sources of income in the basin are fishing and agriculture. Desertification
has led to major detriments to the agricultural sector, as well as the erratic changes of rainfall
which has further destabilized farmers by ruining crops and prompting disease to infect crops
and livestock. Fishing has also been a cause for concern, with catches falling from 220,000 tons
to 100,000 tons between 1974 and 2011. 21 According to Mohammad Bila, a water level monitor
for the Lake Chad Basin Commission, two or three years of normal rainfall can be followed by
up to two years of drought. Thus, everytime there is a reduction in the lake, conflict grows and
instability flourishes.22

17

Nett and Ruttinger, 17.
“Shoring Up Stability – Addressing climate and fragility risks in the Lake Chad region”, Climate
Diplomacy, 2019.
19
Caroline Varin, “No Opportunity Lost: The ISWAP Insurgency in the Changing Climate of Lake Chad
Region”, (African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review, 2020), 145.
20
Natalie Sauer, “Lake Chad not shrinking, but climate is fuelling terror groups: report”, Climate
Diplomacy, 2019.
21
Varin, 146.
22
Megan Darby, Climate change affecting stability across West Africa and Sahel: UN security council,
Climate Home News, 2018.
18
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ISWAP and other NSAGs have taken advantage of shifting instability and desperation among
groups to serve as a source of income, resources, or safety. ISWAP in particular has been
working to create ties with several communities in Lake Chad to fortify their stronghold even
with extremism. Methods used include “taxing” trade, stealing fish cattle and crops, and
garnering ransoms.23 Although violence persists, they have provided various forms of support to
gain recruits from villages. Recently, the militants have built public toilets, clinics, and dug
wells to reach potable water in areas where the government has no presence and have also
created trade routes around government blockades.24
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s Climate Profile
Afghanistan has experienced startling outbursts of violence and armed conflict in the twenty-first
century. The baseline poverty rate is 72%, and is possibly projected to increase up to 97% by
mid-2022.25 Climate change has already deteriorated sectors of the economy, and violence has
been slowly filling those gaps. Scarce resources are becoming more and more competitive to
hold and the government has been less and less attentive to climate change and its most
vulnerable populations.
Climate change in Afghanistan is a rapidly growing, dangerous problem. They are especially
vulnerable to multiple climate-related disasters such as flooding, landslides, and droughts. Most
of this comes as a result of desertification across the country, causing soil erosion and extended
droughts, while snow melts are causing dangerous spring floods.26 Unpredictable weather
patterns are becoming more common, which can be devastating for agriculture and cattle
herding, which we already see being the case.
Afghanistan’s Agriculture
Agriculture livelihoods make up about 45% of the population in Afghanistan, and up to 60%
have agriculture as a part of their income.27 Reliance on rivers as irrigation is also important, as
rivers and streams account for 86% of the irrigation systems within Afghanistan. Drastic changes
to conditions of farming have the potential to lead to massive food insecurity, poverty, and
violence. Just this year, the drought has caused about 40% of crops to be lost, with the price of
wheat(one of the main crops in the region) going up by 25%.28

23

Varin, 150.
Varin, 153.
25
“97 Percent of Afghans Can Plunge Into Poverty by Mid 2022”, UNDP, 2021.
26
Nett and Ruttinger, 30.
27
“Climate Change in Afghanistan”, C-Adapt, 2016.
28
Somini Sengupta, “A New Breed of Crisis”, The New York Times, 2021.
24
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In order to survive, many farmers are turning to illicit crops such as poppy farming. This type of
farming is alluring because the poppy plant needs significantly less water than crops such as
wheat. Opium farming also provides a much higher cash-based income, which fits in perfectly to
farmers needing supportive income. 29 Efforts to stop this widespread crop have not worked,
since very little action has been made on the ground where it is spreading, and instead empty
promises have been made to reform and replace livelihoods.30

The correlation between opium farming and Taliban control
Taken from UN Office on Drugs and Crime; US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction; NATO Resolute

29
30

Nett and Ruttinger, 30.
Parenti, 109.
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Violence Within Disasters
Natural disasters also push insurgency groups into popularity amongst the vulnerable. According
to Germanwatch, Afghanistan is the sixth most affected country by extreme weather disasters in
2019.31 As mentioned before, floods and landslides are major problems that have resulted in
displacement and casualties. There is an overwhelming lack of response to these events because
of government incapacity, economic decline, and more prominent security situations. Insurgency
and terrorist groups move into these areas affected by disaster and provide some relief.
Consequently, they are able to gain more members in these communities.32
Lack of Aid or Direction
Afghans have been caught in the middle of extreme violence and instability for decades, which
has seriously affected the health, well-being, and positions of Afghan citizens throughout the
state. It's therefore important to emphasize how civil and political turmoil, corruption, and
conflict serve as major multipliers in climate change impacts. One of the most distressing effects
is massive migration flows from high conflict areas. While drought-related effects can push
people to leave their homes, a large part of displacement in Afghanistan is due to attacks. The
use of IEDs, targeted killings, and destruction of education and health facilities have led to mass
distress and displacement among citizens. In 2018, around 550,000 Afghans were forced to leave
their homes from violence or loss of livelihoods.33
Along with this, unsustainable land and water management have exacerbated the already
precarious resource situation. There is an unequal distribution of agricultural holdings controlled
by the government, and lack of reinstatement of property by the government as well. This occurs
because of land allocations made to powerful, wealthy elites suggesting that land distribution by
the government is still based on patronage and power.34 Water sources have also been
mismanaged and destabilized over lack of cooperation and entrenchment. Droughts and snow
melt causing diminishing river flow have increased stress on water sources as well. 35

31

David Eckstein, Vera Künzel, Laura Schäfer, “GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2021”,
Germanwatch, 2021, 8.
32
Nett and Ruttinger, 34.
33
“2019 Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview”, OCHA, 2018.
34
“Afghanistan”, Landlinks, 2018.
35
Andrej Přívara 1, and Magdaléna Přívarová, “Nexus between Climate Change, Displacement and
Conflict: Afghanistan Case”, Sustainability 11, no. 20: 5586., 2019.
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This infographic details many different areas and disasters, but the graphs at the bottom
emphasize the increasing danger of flooding in several provinces
Taken from OCHA

Kurdziel 19

Taliban
The Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan serves as a current crisis that has been arguably aided by
climate related changes, and may take a turn for the worse since climate governance is not likely.
As explained before, agriculture in Afghanistan has been precarious and unstable for many
farmers that heavily depend on fruitful crops for income. When farmers struggle to pay back
lenders when their income fails, the Taliban step in to offer a solution and sow resentment of the
government. According to a CBS investigation, the Taliban paid recruited fighters $5-$10 more
per day than what the average farmer was earning daily.36
Now that the Taliban have taken control of the Afghan state, they have made claims that they are
focused on fighting climate change, and eliminating poppy production and cultivation. Quite an
interesting turn since they have benefited from both in the past, especially the lucrative poppy
business. However, they wish to be recognized within the international order as legitimate, and
separating from illegal economic practices seem to be a priority.
Syria
Climate Change or Bad Coincidence?
There is some debate on whether drought in Syria was a direct result of climate change, and if it
directly influenced the onset of the Syrian civil war. A popular article in the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences is highly cited as the precedent for the Syrian climate-conflict
argument. Specifically, they argue that the 2006 drought served as a catalytic effect contributing
to political unrest. Furthermore, the severity of the drought that is implicated in the conflict is
more than twice as likely to be a consequence of human interference in the climate system.37
This was met with some pushback, such as the article by Selby, et al. which argues that there is
no clear evidence that climate change played a role in the drought, and that the drought did not
cause a mass migration which consequently means that drought migration factors contributed to
the Syrian civil war.38
The variance of opinions and analysis in this case highlights the discourse of climate-induced
conflict especially in regards to high-intensity conflicts such as civil wars. First, I find it
necessary to outline the facts of the drought, displacement in Syria, and the onset of the war.
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Syria’s Climate Profile
Syria is located at the center of the Fertile Crescent region, which contains the Nile Basin,
ancient Mesopotamia, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Syria is also a part of the
Mediterranean and Middle East region, giving the state varying climatic trends and geographic
characteristics. Major terrains include the eastern Mediterranean, the cold and warm deserts
spread throughout the country, and the warm semi-arid agricultural region to the northwest.39
Syria has historically been subject to large precipitation variability and several drought seasons.
In the 19th century, six major droughts occurred in Syria where precipitation was recorded as
one-third of what was normal. Agriculture was able to be sustained through these periods
through government relief and backup resources, but the seventh drought starting in 2006 was an
exception. This lasted four seasons as compared to the usual one season drought, and the
precipitation level was the lowest ever recorded in the last century.40

The projected difference climate change has made in Syria’s precipitation
Taken from Circle of Blue
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Effects of the Drought
This obviously impacted many people’s livelihoods. Most of this was concentrated in
northeastern regions, where agriculture is most prominent. Between 2006 and 2009, around 1.3
million people were affected by agricultural failures and 800,000 people lost their livelihoods.41
Wheat and barley yields fell drastically, and livestock also fell. Many herders were forced to sell
their herds between sixty and seventy percent below their usual cost.42 With so many people
driven to food insecurity and losing most of their income, large-scale migration occurred, with
most of it being recorded as rural-urban. The main cities that received an influx of migrants were
Aleppo, Damascus, Dara’a, Hama, and Homs.43
With so many people moving towards the South, little was done by the Assad regime to aid those
remaining farmers in the North, or to help integrate those displaced in the South. Therefore,
scattered illegal settlements sprouted throughout city outskirts that became overcrowded,
crime-ridden, and poverty stricken.44 Water resources also became a massive problem, with
unsustainable irrigation techniques and faulty water basins led to water shortages. In Damascus,
the city’s water basins leaked sixty percent of its water supply, causing migrants to pay inflated
prices for water.45

In this infographic, the drought does correlate with a rise of IDPs, but the Iraq War does as
well
Taken from Climate Central
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ISIS
This precarious environment, whether as a result of climate displacement, government
mismanagement and neglect or a combination of both, led to the terrorist group ISIS to grow
stronger and take control. They began recruiting in the northeast, where the drought hit the
hardest and government support was close to nothing. ISIS saw this opportunity and stepped in
to provide social services, irrigation structures, and clean water to vulnerable communities. As a
result, they easily recruited individuals from these populations that had high grievances against
the Assad regime and government officials. 46
ISIS also has control over critical dams and water supplies, allowing them to extort populations
and gain tighter control. They use dams along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to flood
neighborhoods, cut off electricity or highly tax water supplies, all to gain control over
populations.47 There have also been reports in 2015 of ISIS poisoning water with crude oil in
Iraq and Syria. 48 These extremist methods have caused massive outcries across the globe, and
especially the tragedies that occurred during the civil war. Therefore, it is understandable why so
many scholars and analysts debate over how it developed and how it can be prevented in the
future, with one of the main points being climate change.

The current breakup of Syria
Taken from the BBC
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Discussion and Analysis
After researching and synthesizing these cases and theories, I learned that there isn’t a singular
consensus being reiterated among scholars about any country on the issue of climate-induced
violence. The complexity of information and root cause will always be debated, especially
pertaining to terrorism and non-state armed groups. In my attempt to explicate this problem, I
will focus on the three examples of violence that were shown through my case studies: farmerherder violence, terrorism, and civil war. All three of my case studies have different historical
backgrounds, geography, governmental makeup, etc. This renders it inefficient to try and
compare or contrast, but rather to find how this issue of climactic violence manifests into society,
or if the real issue lies within institutions. Is violence at all influenced by climate change? Is it
appropriate to attribute conflict to climate change? How does this influence policy-making, and
should the focus be on fixing climate change or fixing inadequate governance?
Ethnic and Livelihood Conflicts
This issue has persisted for centuries, and is not always an indicator for an increase in natural
resource conflict. In West Africa where I explained the current farmer-herder conflict within
Nigeria, agriculture and pastoralism have coexisted with some disputes, but both parties are
usually able to reach a resolution. Many categorize these relationships as symbiotic, with two
communities either engaging in host-stranger or host-client relationships.49 Both of these involve
both parties participating in providing some sort of service or goods to facilitate gift-giving and
communication that benefits both sides. For example, agriculturalists giving crops to visiting
pastoralists who reciprocate with livestock or other supplies in good faith. These are essential in
creating resilient and peaceful livelihoods, and creates a channel for resolving conflicts that
inevitably arise between these groups.
However, there is a degradation of these relationships which I have summarized in my case
study. Instead, more intense conflicts are sprouting as a result of land competitiveness and
decreased need for contracts between another group. The question posed here is whether the
violence is increasing as a result of climate change. Some argue that this is not possible, and the
real situation lies in poor land and resource management by the government. Others argue that
climate change serves as a stressor for conflict, as its effects cause droughts, irregular weather,
and destructive flooding. I have discussed the facts in my case studies, but ultimately the data
can always be skewed to favor one argument because of the volatility of this subject.
Looking at this issue through the lens of farmer-herder conflicts in particular, terrain and climate
has more of a part to play in these relationships. Both agriculturalists and pastoralists are
extremely dependent on the quality and quantity of their land for bountiful and successful
seasons. A threat of land degradation or the possibility of land being taken by someone else
directly affects their lives. Of course, there is hard and nonnegotiable data about the effects of
climate change on the terrain in Africa. However, many of these farmers or herders find fault
with government measures that hurt their business.
49
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For herders, it's correct that drought related land degradation has pushed them south.
Government initiatives also have directly hurt herder’s land availability:
“Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) in the 1970s encouraged the use of water pumps
while National Fadama Development Projects (NFDPs) have helped farmers exploit wetlands
(river valleys and floodplains) for dry season irrigated agriculture since 1993. High-value crops
promoted by the National Fadama Development Projects, notably tomatoes and onions, produce
little residue for livestock feeding, further diminishing available fodder.”50
Many blame the government for hurting herders’ business, and it's clear that the government has
not established any successful negotiation or dialogue with herders and farmers. When the
violence started garnering more attention because of its brutality, the Nigerian administration and
police have failed to take on the appropriate responsibility. In fact, Fulani herdsmen have
repeatedly called on the government for more grazing space to no avail. Both the farmers and
herders criticize the Nigerian police force for answering calls too late and failing to punish
agitators and aggressors, which push many herdsmen to seek revenge themselves.51
The relationship between climate change and these outbreaks of violence are more directly
linked than others. When livelihoods are already fragile and heavily rely on the health of the
land, any degradation or significant shift in patterns of precipitation have large consequences of
instability. However, these changes should not cause breakouts of intense violence, because the
government has an obligation to support its citizens in times of need. Unfortunately, it’s clear
many of the government’s promises to squash violence and promote peace are used to delay
actual action and an attempt to save face. This failure helps explain the next large issue of
terrorism.
Terrorism
The extremist groups I focused on in my research were Boko Haram and its branches, the
Taliban, and ISIS. Each have their own history in their respective regions, and profit off of
destabilized populations. The question of climate change effecting terrorism has been growing in
public awareness because of public attention to climate change and migration. In my view, the
effect on climate change on terrorism falls in line more with an indicator perspective. By this I
mean that effects such as drought, flooding, storms, etc. can indicate an opportunity for terrorist
recruitment tactics. For example, a drought can cause massive crop failures for farmers, and if
they are in a position of weakness already, the probability of them working with or joining an
extremist group is much higher. However, the root of their relationship with extremists does not
stem from climate change. Instead, their instability from their livelihoods goes back to state
failure of welfare, safety, and communication. As discussed earlier, this issue dates back to
colonization for these specific countries, ultimately creating a very complex, historical problem.
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Looking at Boko Haram, they originally started gaining support and popularity in Nigeria from
their condemnation of Nigerian governmental elites and their corrupt dealings. The leader and
founder of Boko Haram, Mohammad Yusuf, also rejected parliamentary democracy on the
grounds that it is a vehicle for Western colonization. He was looking to establish a caliphate to
promote universal Sharia law, and also gained interest by saying he had international support
from other international religious actors.52 Therefore, originally many Nigerian citizens and
others in the Lake Chad region were drawn to this because of their own discontent for
government corruption and unfair practices created by other groups.
Another major indicator for terrorist recruitment is unemployment. This was another major tool
used by Boko Haram, since the government failed to bridge the unemployment gap through their
own services. Even international support failed:
“However, as with service access, the employment situation has been changed only superficially
by the relatively upbeat economic environment prevailing since 2000. Not only has it reportedly
created few jobs—the World Bank acknowledges that growth driven by foreign direct investment
in the extractive sector and agriculture has proved insufficiently inclusive—but it has most
importantly benefited mainly the southern metropolitan regions and has barely touched the Lake
Chad region.”53
This mirrors the situation in Afghanistan, with the Taliban creating alternative livelihoods for
desperate farmers. The extremist group is operating more on the basis of providing security to
establish control rather than ideology, but the root cause is the same. The state has failed to
support the land-based livelihoods of their citizens. Climate change pushes the existence of
terrorism forward, but it is in addition to state failure, ethnic tensions, and colonial scars.
With terrorism, I believe all of these factors are major causes, but failure of the state in particular
is to blame for people’s support of terrorism. Especially in these regions, where the presence of
the state is almost nonexistent and farmers have no means to rally for aid by themselves. The
ever-increasing danger of climate change calls on states to appropriately and swiftly be proactive
in their responses to people and places most affected. The specific roles and responsibilities will
be discussed later, but the importance of politics and economics is greatest in the next issue of
civil war.
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Civil War
Civil war is a conflict that stems from deep tensions, divisions, and inequalities brewing within a
nation. Each civil war throughout history, and there have been hundreds, has its own complex
history. Therefore, it is impossible to attribute one cause or aggressor for the outbreak of war.
Most studies and scholars agree and accept this notion, and I found that virtually all of them
mentioned that climate change cannot be the sole cause of a conflict as complex as a civil war.
However, in the controversial study done by Kelley et al. on the influence of drought on the
outbreak of Syria’s civil war, they took a more holistic approach to better back their claim on
climate change causing conflicts. In fact, they emphasized their reliance on providing context
throughout their research, “Our analysis of the conflict in Syria shows an impact of an extreme
climate event in the context of government failure, exacerbated by the singular circumstance of
the large influx of Iraqi refugees.”54 Though environmental and geographical factors are usually
regarded as an acceptable factor in the development of a civil war, climate change is still argued
to not be an actual aggressor. However, Kelley et al. argued against this by stating:
“The strong agreement between observations and climate model simulations in century-long
trends in precipitation, temperature, and sea-level pressure adds confidence to the conclusion that
in this region, the anthropogenic precipitation signal has already begun to emerge from the
natural “noise” and that the recent drought had a significant anthropogenic component.”55
Therefore, the ultimate claim here is that climate change has the potential to induce massive
violence and political wars that otherwise would not have been so severe, or happen at all. With
something so brutal as civil war, it's easy to see why so many other scholars and studies have
rebutted against these claims. Others see it as inappropriate to attribute something as politically,
economically, and culturally motivated like civil war to climate change, since the data overall is
new and emerging. There is even more contention surrounding the role of climate migrants in
these debates, especially in Syria’s case. Many see no causality between migrants from rural to
urban areas during the drought as an indicator of the violence that erupted in Dara’a. For
example, a competing study done by Selby found that:
“...deepening long-term ecological and economic problems themselves had political and
political-economic causes: specifically, the over-expansion and subsequent demise of Syria’s oil
rents-based model of agrarian development; and state policies – an admixture of colonisation,
expropriation, exclusion and neglect – towards an ethnically contested borderland and frontier
zone. It was these twin political or political-economic factors–and not, as is often thought, the
exceptional severity of northeast Syria’s drought–which in this view were the principal causes of
the region’s agricultural decline and out-migration prior to the civil war.”56
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Within the lens of the Syrian civil war, my conclusions align more with Selby’s analysis. Of
course, anthropogenic climate change has affected virtually every nation on earth. However, the
effects of a warming climate and changing weather have yet to be directly correlated with
outbreaks of politically motivated violence like civil war. I think that the potential for climate
change to worsen and thus adversely affect regions and communities is great, so this should not
downplay the danger of climate change. Rather, like most other indicators, climate change
should be a part of a comprehensive analysis when trying to understand large-scale violence, and
not as a sole inducer.
Solutions and Suggestions
Many scholars fail to decipher what exactly states can do to help mitigate climate induced
violence and instability. Instead, the focus is on attributing the problem more on one source or
the other, i.e. government corruption or drought. Perhaps the solutions proposed would be
different if one was seen as a bigger problem than the other. For example, states should be more
involved in climate change initiatives and promise to lessen their emissions or vow to promote
welfare services.
First, climate change initiatives should be accepted and applied to all countries, since all will be
affected if the climate continues to degrade. However, the question of how developing countries
will contribute to reducing emissions is controversial. The top 3 contributors to the global
emissions rate is China, the United States and the EU, collectively totalling 41.5%, and the top
ten overall accounts for over two-thirds. The bottom 100 countries in comparison only account
for 3.6% of global emissions.57 Specifically from the case studies prior, Nigeria is .23% of the
world CO2 emissions total, with Syria being .11% and Afghanistan .03%. 58 All countries have
been slowly increasing their emissions over the years, and Nigeria in particular has been of
concern. Nigeria’s greenhouse gas emissions increased by 25% from 1990 to 2014, compared to
the average annual change in total emissions of 1%. 59
The connection between poverty and greenhouse gas emissions adds another layer of complexity
to a countries’ responsibility. According to World Economic Forum:
“An increase in carbon emissions observed over 30 years shows that poverty has been reduced
within East Asia and Pacific and South Asia, while sub-Saharan Africa has, during the same time
period, reduced their emissions and almost doubled the number of people living in poverty.”60
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In worldwide climate initiatives run by international organizations, developing countries are not
held to the same standards as the highly emitting developed countries. However, they do still
need to be aware of the problem surrounding their contributions and leniencies towards
emissions, pollution, etc. But arguably, their main focus should be on their own citizens’ well
beings and attempting to reduce poverty. There is some evidence that investing in renewable
energy can fix the issue of emissions vs. poverty, seen in energy sources such as solar or
hydropower. Particularly in Africa, new innovations and processes are needed to meet increasing
demands for electricity. According to Earth.org:
“Aiming to provide electricity for everyone on the continent would require a significant increase
in electricity generation, with only 43% of Africans currently having a reliable power supply.
According to the report, electricity demand on the continent will more than double by 2040.”61
Thus, renewable energy can both be used to meet demands and increase development and job
opportunity, and also benefit the environment.
However, many developing governments do not have the means to start mass production and
development of renewable energy. They are struggling to manage production and management of
basic sectors like agriculture, seen in the case studies. The focus must be on good governance
and better management of critical resources and livelihoods. Pushing for greater capacity within
governments would greatly aid some of the root problems in these conflict situations. For
example, in Nigeria the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) is working with
the government to invest in poor, rural communities. Specifically, to strengthen the economy
they are:
“Developing the sustainable, climate-resilient economic and financial inclusion of young people
in profitable agribusiness; and strengthening institutions at state and community levels to work
with private companies in key value chains.”62
Financial independence, inclusion, and accessibility is key to empowering farmers or pastoralists
to better their livelihoods and put themselves in a position to not engage with violent groups.
Investing in younger demographics will also be a foundation for a brighter future. While there
are countless laws and initiatives for boosting their rural economic sectors developing countries
can enact, there should also be a space for hybrid climate-economic policies. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development outlined the main features in creating climate adaptation
development systems:
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Abandon austerity as the default policy framework to be able to be more flexible in
policy-making.
Large-scale public investment in building a diversified low-carbon economy, powered by
renewable energy sources and green technologies, and where economic activities within and
across sectors are interconnected through resource-efficient linkages.
Adopt a green industrial policy that proactively identifies the areas where the most significant
constraints to climate adaptation investment are; channeling public and private investment to
these activities; and monitoring whether these investments are managed well.
Adopt a green agricultural policy that protects small producers, provides backward and
forward linkages to green industrialization, protects the environment and enhances food security
through increased agricultural productivity and income security.
Diversify and reduce dependence on primary commodities by using renewable energy
production and the circular economy. Renewable energy production can economically operate at
a low scale, opening business opportunities for small firms and rural areas.63
These goals allow for forward-thinking policies to be born in states such as Nigeria, Afghanistan,
and Syria. Of course, it is extremely difficult for states already dealing with corruption or
terrorism to implement climate adaption policies. Histories of weak governing, colonialism, and
war can be blamed, but the way forward must be prioritized.
Looking Forward
The current situations in these three countries have not been greatly improving. In Nigeria,
farmer-herder violence and terrorism continue to worsen even past government military
intervention. Banditry is on the rise, with over 120 gangs operating across six states, contributing
to thousands of deaths, crop and cattle thefts, and destruction of entire villages.64 In Afghanistan,
the recent Taliban takeover of the entire state has led to mass migrations and an
economic/humanitarian crisis. Opium production exceeded six thousand tons for the fifth year in
a row.65 Syria continues to be divided and in intense turmoil of indiscriminate violence and
bombings. There has been growing discontent and protests across the country as a result of food
insecurity and fuel shortages, which has increased by 50% in a year to 12.4 million. 66 Even after
ten years of war, there seems to be no efforts on either side to promote peace or stability to the
distressed population.
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All countries place high in the Fragile States Index67, and many of the indicators used to
calculate the placement in that index are the same as the indicators discussed prior that lead to
various conflicts. This comparison extends to many other countries that place high, and climate
change can lead to cracks in any fragile country. Climate change is also not the only aggressor of
violence that is emerging-dwindling resources, overpopulation, and dangerous cyber attacks can
also aggravate or enable violent groups or governments to use violence.
Covid-19 complications have only worsened the economic situations in all states, and have likely
diverted attention away from the climate crisis or any preventative adaptation measures.
However, the main concern in every state has to be protecting the lives of their citizens. In
complex conflicts involving deep tensions and divisions, the first step is to de-escalate and
protect civilians. Many states have failed at those basic protections, and no climate policy or UN
forum can change those lives that were lost to political violence. However, the potential for
climate-induced destruction, violence, and chaos will only increase over time if there are no
preventative actions taken by developing and developed countries, and international
organizations. The problem has been recognized on a global scale, but states have to take
individual responsibility for combating violence and displacement in impoverished areas of
agriculture and pastoralism.
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